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This paper formalizes the relation between comparative statics and the out-of-equilibrium ex-
planation for how a system evolves after a change in parameters. The paper has two main
results. First, an increase in an exogenous parameter sets o learning dynamics that involve
larger values of the endogenous variables. Second, equilibrium selections that are not monotone
increasing in the exogenous variables must be predicting unstable equilibria. Moreover, under
some conditions monotone comparative statics and stability are equivalent.
Resumen
En este trabajose formalizala relaci on entre la est atica comparada y las explicaciones din amicas
de c o m oc a m b i au ns i s t e m al u e g od eu nc a m b i oe nu np a r  ametro. El trabajo fundamental-
mente presenta dos resultados. Primero, que un incremento en un par ametro ex ogeno induce
din amicas de aprendizaje que involucran mayores valores de las variables end ogenas. Segundo,
que selecciones de equilibriosque no son mon otonasen las variables ex ogenas tienen que predecir
equilibrios inestables. Mas aun, bajo ciertas condiciones, las propiedades de est atica comparada
mon otona y estabilidad son equivalentes.
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We nd ourselves confronted with this paradox: in order for the compara-
tive statics analysis to yield fruitful results, we must rst develop a theory of
dynamics.
Samuelson (1947, p. 262)
The intuitionbehind comparative statics results is usually dynamic in nature. The economic
explanation for why dierences in endogenous variables result from variations in exogenous
variables often takes the form of some sequential adjustment process. For example, consider
Milgrom, Qian, and Roberts's (1991) account of technological and organizational changes in
modern manufacturing: \... the falling costs of high-speed data communication, data process-
ing, and ﬂexible, multitask equipment lead to increases in the directly aected activities, which
through a web of complementarities then lead to increases in a set of related activities as well."
Despite the prevalence of dynamic economic explanations, the formal analysis is static. The
existing results on monotone comparative statics of equilibria can be summarized in the state-
ment of Milgrom and Roberts's (1990, MR hereafter) theorem that the extremal (largest and
smallest) equilibria in a parameterized supermodular game are increasing in the parameter. 1
In any game, however, we can have a large number of equilibria and there are a priori no
reasons to expect the largest or smallest equilibrium to be played. One possibility is using
out-of-equilibrium dynamics to select the equilibrium played after a change in parameters.
Consider the following game. There are two agents that choose simultaneously the eort
level x 2 [0;1] that they put into a common task. They use a common technology whose
productivity is indexed by a real number t, so that a higher t implies a higher productivity.
Let i(x;t)b ew o r k e ri's optimal choice of eort when the other agent chooses x, i.e. her
best response function. Then, (x;t)=1(2(x;t);t) is called the aggregate best response
function and the Nash equilibria of the game coincide with the xed points of (:;t). Assume
that the players' eorts are complementary so that i(x;t)i si n c r e a s i n gi nx and that higher
productivity makes each agent want to work higher so that it is also increasing in t.F i g u r e1
1Lippman, Mamer, and McCardle (1987) were the rst to present a result of this kind, they prove that the
parameterized set of xed points admits a monotone selection. Sobel (1988) developed the result for extremal
equilibria independently of MR. Milgrom and Shannon (1994) generalize the result to games of ordinal strategic




























































Figure 1: An increase in t
shows a typical aggregate best response function for a game of strategic complementarities like
the one described. The dotted graph represents the game after an increase in the parameter,
E(t) denotes the set of equilibria for parameter t.
Figure 1 shows that, in accordance with the MR result, the smallest and largest equilibria
increase after an increase in t. However, we might expect agents to be playing equilibrium e2.
In this case the results for extremal equilibria are silent. On the other hand, for small parameter
changes the Implicit Function Theorem gives local comparative statics at each equilibria. If we
expect e2 to be played we obtain a conclusion opposite to MR's result: e0
2, the closest \new"
equilibrium, is smaller than e2. 2
On the other hand, Samuelson's Correspondence Principle (CP) says that, selecting equilib-
ria that are stable for some reasonable out-of-equilibrium dynamics gives unambiguous compar-
ative statics results. Note that e2 and e0
2 are unstable for the \Cournot best response dynamics",
xn = (xn−1;t). 3
It seems then that, unless there is a reason for selecting extremal equilibria, the old meth-
2Milgrom and Roberts (1994, p. 455) mention this fact and say that a local application of their result predicts
the decrease.
3In Samuelson's (1947) analysis, the comparative statics are obtained using the implicit function theorem on
parameterized \equilibrium conditions" (a system of equations) and the correspondence principle imposes signs
on the resulting derivatives by requiring the equilibrium to be stable with respect to some specied dynamics.
2ods of comparative statics coupled with the selection criterion of choosing stable equilibria
have an advantage over the new literature. 4 In the example, since all increasing selections of
equilibria pick stable points, the Implicit Function Theorem coupled with the CP yields unam-
biguous comparative statics results. MR's result does not give a conclusive answer to how the
endogenous variables change after an increase in t.
This paper shows that if the new methods are endowed with the CP then they too yield
unambiguous comparative statics. Two main ideas are developed, they are illustrated using the
above example:
1. If the workers are at an equilibrium and there is an increase in productivity, then each
one will desire to increase her eort. If both agents realize this, then, because of comple-
mentarity between eorts, they will want to further increase their eorts. This argument
suggests that any prediction of play after an increase in the parameter should involve
larger eorts than the former equilibrium. For example, consider the \Cournot best re-
sponse dynamics" where in each round, players select a best response to last round's play.
In Figure 1 it is easy to see that this dynamic in the t0-game starting at any of the three
equilibria for the t-game converges to a larger equilibrium (this is indicated by the arrows
in Figure 1).
In the paper I show that play will be larger after an increase in the parameter for a general
class of dynamics. In addition, considering a class of adjustment dynamics similar to that
used in Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1991) and Milgrom and Shannon (1994), convergence
to larger equilibria can be ensured.
2. What is wrong about equilibrium e2?S i n c ee2 has arbitrarily close smaller equilibria cor-
responding to larger parameter values, then, by starting at any of these smaller equilibria,
decreasing the parameter to t and reasoning as in Item 1 we obtain a prediction of play
that is yet smaller. For this reason, e2 must be unstable under any dynamics obtained by
reasoning as in Item 1.
4Pareto optimality or coalition proofness are reasons to select extremal equilibria in e.g. games of coordination
failures. But also in many of these examples the interesting feature of the model is that the socially optimal
equilibria may not be selected (like in network externalities or macroeconomic coordination failures).
3On the other hand, by looking at the change from e1 to e0
1 and from e3 to e0
3 it can be seen
that these selections are increasing and select stable equilibria. Hence, in this picture,
stability is the same as monotonicity. This turns out to be a general result, as I show in
Section 4.
Since instability of equilibria usually leads game theorists (and probably players too) to
doubt that players will select a particular equilibrium, my results imply that we should be
at least suspicious about a selection of equilibria that is not monotone in the parameter.
The CP gives monotone comparative statics results as long as we agree to rene away
unstable equilibria.
Thus, if endowed with the CP, the recent methods for comparative statics of equilibria yield
unambiguous conclusions. In this sense, the CP presented in this paper has the same advantage
over Samuelson's as the new comparative statics methods represented by the theorems of Topkis
and Milgrom and Shannon have over the old (see Milgrom and Shannon (1994)for a discussion).
No convexity or smoothness of the maps or spaces involved is needed, no Inada conditions, no
need to restrict to Euclidean spaces. Given the importance of increasing returns and other
non-convexities in many areas of Economics, it is important to have methods that do not
require convexity. If the example presented above had discrete choice sets, the Implicit Function
Theorem could not have been used. In Section 6.2 I present Farrell and Saloner's (1985) network
externalities model as an example where none of the existing comparative statics methods are
useful.
A nal advantage of this version of the CP is that the dynamics used encompass a wide
array of behavioral assumptions. In this sense the results are robust to the specication of
out-of-equilibrium dynamics.
Samuelson gave examples of economic models where he was able to obtain local comparative
statics conclusions by imposing stability. Some of Samuelson's applications are covered by my
results on monotone maps. The others are explained in Section 5: in non monotone one-
dimensional problems like partial equilibrium and two good general equilibrium models the
CP works. In general multidimensional cases the principle need not yield comparative statics
4conclusions. 5 Here I extend the applicabilityof the CP to arbitrarylattices(withoutrestrictions
on dimensions) as long as complementarity is built into the model.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents basic denitions and notation. Section 3
contains the results on convergence to larger equilibrium values and its application to games
of strategic complements. Section 4 presents two versions of the CP and some partial converse
results. Section 5 discusses on the scope of the CP, Section 6 contains an illustration of the
results through three applications and Section 7 concludes. Except for a few that are both
short and give insight, all proofs are in Section 8.
2 Definitions
2.1 Standard Denitions
A detailed discussion of the concepts dened in this subsection can be found in Topkis (1998).
As e tX with a transitive, reﬂexive, antisymmetric binary relation  is a lattice if whenever
x;y 2 X, x ^ y =i n f fx;yg and x _ y =s u p fx;yg exist in X.I t i s complete if for every
nonempty subset A of X,i n fA;supA exist in X. A nonempty subset A of X is a sublattice if
for all x;y 2 A, x^X y;x_X y 2 A,w h e r ex^X y and x_X y are obtained taking the inmum
and supremum as elements of X (as opposed to the relative order on A). A nonempty subset
A  X,i ssubcomplete if B  A, B 6= ; implies infX B;supX B 2 A, again taking inf and sup of
B as a subset of X. For two subsets A;B of X,s a yt h a tA is smaller than B in the strong set
order, denoted A s B,i fa 2 A, b 2 B implies a^b 2 A;a_b 2 B.T h eorder interval topology
on a lattice is obtained by taking the closed intervals [x;y]=fz 2 X : x  z  yg as a sub-basis
for the closed sets. All lattices in the paper will be endowed with the order interval topology. I
will use  to denote the order on lattices and  to refer to the order on indexes and R.I fX is
a lattice, a function f : X ! R is quasisupermodular if for any x;y 2 X, f(x)  f(x^y) implies
f(x _y)  f(y)a n df(x) >f(x^ y) implies f(x_ y) >f(y). Let T be a partially ordered set,
a function f : X  T ! R satises the single crossing condition in (x;t) if whenever x  x0
and t  t0, f(x;t)  f(x0;t) implies that f(x;t0)  f(x0;t 0)a n df(x;t) <f (x0;t) implies that
5The negative result is not new, Arrow and Hahn (1971) argued that for general equilibrium analysis, the CP
was not of much use; imposing stability alone does not guarantee unambiguous comparative statics predictions.
5f(x;t0) <f(x0;t 0). Say that f satises the strict single crossing condition in (x;t) if whenever
x  x0 and t  t0, f(x;t)  f(x0;t) implies that f(x;t0) <f(x0;t 0).
2.2 Denitions and Notation for this Paper
Lex X be a lattice. Say that a correspondence  : X  X is weakly increasing if for any
x;x0 2 X with x  x0 we have inf (x)  inf (x0)a n ds u p(x)  sup(x0). Also, say that  is
strongly increasing if for any x;x0 2 X with x  x0 we have sup(x)  inf (x0). 6 Let T be a
partially ordered set. An increasing family of correspondences (t : t 2 T) is a correspondence
 : X  T  X such that x 7! t(x) is weakly increasing and t 7! t(x) is strongly increasing.
If, in addition, x 7! t(x) is upper hemicontinuous and subcomplete sublattice valued then it
will be called an increasing family of uhc correspondences.L e tE = fx 2 X : x 2 (x)g be the
set of 's xed points. When (t : t 2 T) is a family of correspondences, the notation will be
E(t)=fx 2 X : x 2 t(x)g.L e t(x)=i n f(x)a n d(x)=s u p(x) for all x.
Given a sequence fxkg in X,l e tH
γ
k = fxk−γ;:::x k−1g (set x−l = x0 for 1  l  γ to
simplify notation) be the history of length γ at time k. Denote the whole history at k by
Hk(= Hk
k). Also, the set fz 2 X : x  zg will be denoted [x;M]( w h e nX is complete we can
say supX = M). For any subset A of a topological space, Ao will denote the set of interior
points of A.
Say that a function f on a Euclidean space is strictly increasing if x y implies f(x) f(y).








and t  t0 implies g(x)  g(x0). Note that this is not just the negation of weakly increasing, it




over which the function is increasing.
2.3 Games of Strategic Complementarities
The denition of games of strategic complementarities is taken from Milgrom and Shannon
(1994), it is an ordinal generalization of the supermodular games introduced by Topkis (1979).
6Note that when  is a function, i.e. single valued, both concepts coincide with the usual notion of \monotone
nondecreasing". Note that if  is monotone in the strong set order (i.e. if x  x
0 then (x) s (x
0)) then it
is weakly increasing and that if  is strongly increasing then it is monotone in the strong set order. In turn,
strongly increasing is equivalent to every selection from the correspondence being a monotone nondecreasing
function.
6Games of strategic complementarities are very common in economics, examples can be found
in e.g. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Topkis (1998).
Definition 1: Let N be the set of players, each described by a strategy set Si and payo
function ui : j2NSj ! R.A game of (ordinal) strategic complementarities is a pair Γ=
(N;f(Si;u i):i 2 Ng) where for all i 2 N:
1. Si is a complete lattice, ui is quasisupermodular in si for all s−i 2 S−i and satises the
single-crossing property in (si;s −i).
2. The map s−i 7! ui(si;s −i) is continuous for all si 2 Si.E i t h e r si 7! ui(si;s −i) is
continuous for all s−i 2 S−i or si 7! ui(si;s −i) is upper semicontinuous for all s−i 2 S−i
and the order interval topology on Si regular. 7
For all i 2 N, dene i's best response correspondence i : S−i  Si by i(s−i)=argmax^ si2Siui(^ si;s −i),
and the aggregate best response correspondence  : S  S by (s)=i2Ni(s−i)
Definition 2: Let T be a partially ordered set. An indexed family of games of strategic com-
plementarities (Γ(t);t2 T) with Γ(t)=( N;f(Sit;u it):i 2 Ng) is an increasing family of games
if for all i 2 N, t 7! Sit is nondecreasing in the strong set order and uit satises the strict single
crossing property in (si;t) for all s−i 2 S−i.
Lemma 1 establishes that the results in the paper are applicable to increasing families of
games. (Recall that the set of xed points of the best response correspondence is the set of Nash
equilibria of the game from which it was derived). The Lemma follows immediately from known
results on comparative statics, although the result when payos are only upper semicontinuous
requires an additional argument (see Section 8). 8
Lemma 1: Let (Γ(t);t2 T) be an increasing family of games, then (t : t 2 T) is an increasing
family of uhc correspondences.
7In particular, if the Si are subsets of a Euclidean space the results apply for upper semicontinuous functions.
8Lemma 1 and Theorem 3 imply that E(t) is nonempty. In this sense, the result is related to Vives's (1990)
Theorem 5.1 and to Topkis's (1979) results on algorithms for nding equilibria. It is slightly more general, though,
since it relaxes continuity of payos to semicontinuity (important in economics for Bertrand-like situations) and
requires only quasisupermodularity.
73 Adaptive Dynamics and Comparative Statics
This section presents results on the dynamic behavior of a system that is perturbed \upwards".
The purpose is to capture, in a general framework the intuition in the Introduction for games of
strategic complementarities: An increase in a parameter makes each player desire larger actions.
In turn, because of complementarity between players' choices, the fact that other players pick
larger actions goes in the same direction, again making larger choices more desirable. Theorem 1
is the main result. It provides the comparative statics conclusion that the state x of a system
that is perturbed upwards is permanently larger. 9
The (reduced form of the) model will be a correspondence  on a lattice. The main appli-
cation of the results in the paper is to games, where  is the aggregate best response corresp-
ondence ( in the example in the Introduction). The x  inf (x) hypothesis in the theorem
is meant to capture an \upward" shift in the state of a system. Typically,  will be indexed
by partially ordered parameters t so that t is strongly increasing in t.T h i si st h ec a s ei nt h e
example in the Introduction. If x 2 t(x)i sat-equilibrium and t  t0 then t(x)  t0(x)
strongly so x  inf t0(x).
The second hypothesis of the theorem is that dynamics fxkg satisfyx = x0 and inf (inf Hk) 
xk for all k  1. Consider a Bertrand oligopoly game and let  be its aggregate best response
correspondence. The requirement in the theorem is that rms choose prices that are larger than
the smallest prices they would consider optimal if they conjecture that all other rms choose
their lowest price in the history of play. Below I argue that most adaptive learning processes
that are usually considered satisfy this hypothesis.
Theorem 1: Let X be a lattice and x 2 X.L e t : X  X be a correspondence that is weakly
increasing on [x;M].I f x  inf (x) then x is a lower bound on any sequence fxkg in X
satisfying x = x0 and inf (inf Hk)  xk for all k  1.
Proof: I will show by induction that x is a lower bound on Hk for all k, which proves the
theorem. First, since fxg = H1 the statement is true for k = 1. Second, if x is a lower bound on
9In the learning literature one of the main questions is that of convergence to equilibria for any starting point.
Here the focus lies in the comparison of the starting point and the future behavior of the dynamic process
8Hk−1, then inf Hk−1 2 [x;M]. Since  is weakly increasing in this interval, (x)  (inf Hk−1).
Now, x  (x)a n d(inf Hk−1)  xk imply that x  xk.S i n c eHk = Hk−1[fxkg, the inductive
hypothesis and x  xk imply that x is a lower bound on Hk. 
It should be emphasized that Theorem 1 requires no assumptions of continuity or compact-
ness. It is a simple fact about the order structure of the problem. Correspondingly, there is no
result about convergence to equilibria beyond the remark that if play converges it has to be to
a point that is larger than x. This is analogous to the literature on comparative statics for de-
cision problems where the results are established independently of the topological assumptions
usually needed to guarantee existence. Section 3.1 discusses an important class of adjustment
dynamics that satisfy the conditions in Theorem 1 and where conclusions about equilibria can
be obtained.
Interpret  as a best response correspondence. Purely adaptive examples of learning pro-
cesses that satisfythe requirement in the theorem are Cournot best response dynamics, ctitious
play (as best response to historic frequency of play) and the \generalized adaptive dynamics"
discussed in next subsection. When player's choices are one dimensional then also local \better
response" dynamics like gradient optimization algorithms is included.
The backward looking behavior implicit in adaptive play may seem too naive. The hypoth-
esis of Theorem 1 also allows forward looking behavior, though. In the applications to games,
any nite number of rounds of \I know that you know ... that I play a best response to Hk"
will satisfy the condition in Theorem 1 since these rounds are just iterations of .
3.1 Limit Behavior and Equilibria
The dynamics used here is a specialization of the learning process studied in Milgrom and
Roberts (1990, 1991) and Milgrom and Shannon (1994). In the context of games, MR's dy-
namics ask that for any round of play K there be a period K0 such that if K0  k then play
at round k can be roughly justied as a response to the history of play between K and k.
The \generalized adaptive dynamics" that I use here retain the ﬂavor in MR's denition while
pinning down play in every round.
9Definition 3: Let X be a lattice and  : X  X a correspondence. A sequence fxkg in








for all k  1.L e tD(x0;) be the set of all sequences that are generalized
adaptive dynamics from  starting at x0.
An important example of generalized adaptive dynamics is the set of simple adaptive dy-
namics from  starting at x 2 X:
A(x;)=ffxkg
1
k=0 : x0 = x;xk 2 (xk−1);k 1gD (x;):
These members of the class of adaptive dynamics take the form of Cournot best response
dynamics in games and tatonnement price adjustment in market models.
As an illustration consider a Bertrand pricing game with three rms and γ =2 .I f r m s1
and 2 have set prices (1,3) and (3,1) in the last two periods then rm 3 is \allowed" to set any
price between its smallest best response to (1,1) and its largest best response to (3,3). While
ctitious play of the kind where the inﬂuence of past play smoothly fades away is not included
it is easily seen that by allowing γ to be large enough any such play can be approximated by
generalized adaptive dynamics.
The generalized adaptive dynamics are a restriction of MR's learning process. The main
specialization is that I restrict \play" in every time period. A less important dierence with
MR is that the present dynamics incorporates explicitly a bound on the memory of the process.
This bound is also present in Milgrom and Roberts's denition (although it is not uniform). 10
MR's class of dynamics contains some learning processes that turn out not to yield good
predictions for comparative statics. The reason is that they do not necessarily specify behavior
for nite sets of rounds of play. Think of  as a best response correspondence, MR's denition
basically asks the player to eventually play something moderately rational. This does not rule
out that, for example, in the rst rounds play goes to both inf X and supX,t h u sd e s t r o y i n g
the eect of starting at an equilibrium for an \old" parameter value. The idea in the present
10My denition is phrased in terms of best responses to historical play instead of MR's denition as strategies
that are not dominated when players are restricted to an interval formed from past play. By Lemma 1 of MR
this is without loss of generality for supermodular games.
10comparative statics results is that a particular equilibrium is being played before a change in
the parameter and that this starting point will inﬂuence the situation after an increase in the
parameter.
I will denote the set of limits of adaptive dynamics starting at x 2 X by
F(x;)=






Theorems 2 and 3 are results for uhc correspondences. The main applications are to con-
tinuous functions and best response correspondences arising from games of strategic comple-
mentarities (see Section 2.3). 11
Theorem 2: Let X be a complete lattice and x 2 X.L e t : X  X be a uhc correspondence
that is weakly increasing on [x;M].I f x  inf (x) then F(x;) is nonempty with smallest
element inf F(x;)=i n ffz 2E: x  zg and inf F(x;) 2E.
Theorem 2 presents the main comparative statics result in this section. If x  inf (x)t h e n
the limits of adaptive dynamics starting at x are larger than the smallest of the equilibria that
are larger than x. This means that all equilibria reached from x are larger than x, a comparative
statics statement.
Theorem 2 implies that fz 2E: x  zg is nonempty. This fact yields a proof of MR's
comparative statics result for extremal equilibria (and of Milgrom and Shannon's (1994) gen-
eralization to games of ordinal strategic complements, see section 2.3).
Corollary 1: (Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Milgrom and Shannon (1994)) Let
(t;t2 T) be an increasing family of uhc correspondences. Let t;t0 2 T, t  t0.T h e ninf E(t) 
inf E(t0) and supE(t)  supE(t0).
Proof: The suprema and inma are all well dened since by Zhou's (1994) xed point the-
orem the set of equilibria is a complete lattice. Let e =s u p E(t). Then, by Theorem 2,
e  inf F(e;t0)  supE(t0) since inf F(e;t0) 2E (t0). The result for inma follows analo-
gously. 
11Villas-Boas (1997) presents results on comparative statics of xed points for equilibrium problems more
general than games of strategic complements. Theorem 2, however, does apply to hypothesis similar (though
stronger) to Villas-Boas's (1997).
11Theorem 3 presents important additional information about the map x 7! F(x;). This
theorem also turns out to be instrumental in obtaining the other results in the paper.
Theorem 3: Let X be a complete lattice and x 2 X.L e t : X  X be a uhc correspondence
that is weakly increasing on [x;M].I fx  inf (x) then
1. F(x;) has a largest element supF(x;) 2Eand for all fxkg2D (x;), inf F(x;) 
liminfk xk  limsupk xk  supF(x;);
2. if, in addition,  is strongly increasing over [x;M] then for all fxkg2A (x;), limxk
exists and limxk 2 F(x;) \E .
Theorem 3 is useful for obtaining results for learning processes that converge in distribu-
tion. A very common question in the learning literature is whether a given learning dynamics
converges in distribution. Corollary 2 gives the comparative statics implications of weak con-
vergence when it is achieved. Dene the empirical distributions as measures n on the Borel
sets of S by n(O)=jfk  n : xk 2 Ogj=n. Clearly the analogous result for convergence of
marginal distributions (as in some learning models) is true by a very similar argument.
Corollary 2: Let fxkg be any generalized adaptive play satisfying the conditions of Theo-
rem 2. If the corresponding sequence of empirical distributions fng converges weakly to ,
then the support of  (when the support exists) is contained in [inf F(e;);supF(e;)].
4 The Correspondence Principle
4.1 Wrong comparative statics select unstable equilibria
The main result of this section is Theorem 4: a continuous selector e(t) 2E (t)t h a ti sn o t
monotone increasing must be picking unstable equilibria. The result is established at the same
level of generality as Theorem 1. The intuition is very simple. If, in any neighborhood of e(t)
there is e(t0)w i t ht  t0 and e(t)  e(t0), then, starting the t-dynamics at e(t0)T h e o r e m1
says that play is bounded above by e(t0) and hence cannot converge to e(t). This implies that
12e(t) is unstable. 12
This paper uses \asymptotic stability" as a notion of stability: after any small deviation
the system converges back to the equilibrium point. This seems an appropriate requirement
for an equilibrium when viewed as the steady state of a dynamic system, an equilibrium that
is not stable is not likely to be played for a long period of time.
Definition 4: Let  : X  X.Ap o i n t^ x 2 X is best case stable if there is a neighborhood
V of ^ x in X such that for all x in V ,t h e r ei sfxkg2D (x;) with xk ! ^ x.Ap o i n t^ x 2 X
is worst case stable if there is a neighborhood V of ^ x in X such that for all x in V and all
fxkg2D (x;), xk ! ^ x.
The correspondence  here denes a class of dynamics, as opposed to the unique trajectories
generated in the dynamical systems that are normally studied. Hence there is some ambiguity
in the usual notions of stability. The denitions above capture this ambiguity and the present
results gives the strongest possible conclusions: the \wrong" comparative statics choose equi-
libria that are not even best case stable while \correct" comparative statics select worst case
stable equilibria.
Theorem 4: Let (t;t 2 T) be an increasing family of correspondences on a lattice X and
T  Rn convex. Let e : T ! X be a continuous selection from (E(t):t 2 T).I fe is nowhere








with t  t  t, e(t) is not
best case stable for t. 13









with ^ t  t,s oe(^ t)  e(t). Then e(^ t) 2 V .L e t fxkg2D (e(^ t); t). Now,
e(^ t) 2 ^ t(e(^ t)) and ^ t  t so e(^ t)  inf t(e(^ t)). By Theorem 1, e(^ t) is a lower bound on fxkg,
so any accumulation point  of fxkg satises e(^ t)  .T h e ne(^ t)  e(t), implies  6= e(t). In
particular xk 9 e(t). 
12I do not discuss the existence of continuous selections, this is also in line with the literature, see the comment
in page 9.
13Actually, the proof shows that for any neighborhood V of e(t), there is x0 2 V such that e(t) is not an
accumulation point for any generalized adaptive dynamics from t starting at x0. In particular, if play converges
in distribution, e(t) does not belong to the support of the limiting distribution (see Corollary 2).






are not ordered. 2) Since
A(e(t); t) D (e(t); t), non increasing selections are not best case stable when restricting
dynamics to A(e(t); t). 3) It can be seen from the proof that the theorem is true also allowing
dynamics that only satisfy the condition in Theorem 1.
The requirement of nowhere weakly increasing may seem strange (see section 2 for a de-
nition) but actually if there is any t;t0 2 T with t  t0 and e(t)  e(t0) then there will be an
interval in the conditions of the theorem.
Note that the source of the instability comes from perturbations in the parameters. This
is an additional reason to discard non-increasing selections: consider the example in the Intro-
duction, if workers are slightly wrong about their productivity then by adjusting they would
move far away from the equilibrium prescribed by the selection.
The main disadvantage of Theorem 4 is that it focuses on continuous selections and convex
parameter spaces in Rn. In Figure 1 the closest smaller new equilibrium is unstable but we are
comparing two discrete parameter values t  t0, not considering continuous selections. 14 Theo-
rem 5 establishes that the largest new equilibrium that is smaller than the original equilibrium
must be unstable, without requiring continuous selections.
Theorem 5: Let X  Rm, T a partially ordered set and (ft;t2 T) be an increasing family of
uhc functions. 15 Fix t;t0 2 T with t  t0,l e te;e 2E (t0) with e  e and E(t0) \ [e;e]=fe;eg.
If e 2E(t) with e  e e then e is not best case stable.
Figure 2 explains the statement of Theorem 5. In part a), e 2E (t)i sat-equilibrium, e is
the largest t0-equilibrium that is smaller than e and e is the smallest t0-equilibrium that is larger
than e. Then, if there are no t0-equilibria in [e;e] (i.e. if there are no equilibria unordered with e
in [e;e]) then e is unstable and, under some additional requirements e is stable (see Theorem 7).
On the other hand, in part b) there are e1;e 2;e 3 2E(t0) \ [e;e]. Then the equilibria e1;e 2 and
14More importantly, it is possible to draw pictures so that the two equilibria cannot be joined by a continuous
selection of xed points.
15 The result is true when X is a subset of a Banach lattice whose positive cone has nonempty interior, the
proof uses only this structure. Moreover, the result is true when only ft0 is monotone and e  f(e;t
0) i.e. the












Figure 2: Comparative Statics without continuous selectors
e3 must be unstable but we do not know if e is stable or not. 16
Theorem 5 explains exactly the situation in Figure 1 where stability yields a comparative
statics conclusion without the need to restrict to continuous selectors: In a one-dimensional
problem like the one in Figure 1 there are no unordered elements.
Example 1: (The CP and the Monotone Selection Theorem)
The CP can be linked to comparative statics predictions for parameterized optimization
problems. This use of the CP is reﬂected for example in Brock (1983), Hatta (1980) and Magill
and Sheinkman (1979). Let X be a lattice, T a partially ordered set and f : X  T ! R.
Then  : T  X dened by (t) = argmaxx2Xf(x;t) is a \worst response correspondence"
that is constant over X. Clearly, any x 2 (t)i sb e s tc a s es t a b l es i n c ef o ra n y^ x 2 X, setting
x0 =^ x and xk = x for all k  1 gives adaptive play that starts at ^ x and converges to x.
Stability means simply that we are at a maximum, hence Samuelson's CP takes the form of
the usual requirements for suciency of a solution to rst order conditions (i.e. concavity and
interiority).
By Lemma 1, ((t):t 2 T) is an increasing family of correspondences. Here, the conclusion
in Theorem 4 is trivial. Any continuous selection of maxima is monotone increasing, but this is
already what we know by Milgrom and Shannon's (1994) Monotone Selection Theorem In the
present context one of the applications of the CP in the older literature is rendered trivial by
the more recent results on comparative statics. 17
16This statement does not follow from Theorem 5 but it is easily seen from its proof why it is true.
17Brock (1983), Hatta (1980) and Magill and Sheinkman (1979) did not assume the kind of complementarity
required here, so the claim is not that their results are now trivial. Another dierence is that these authors
related local maxima to local stability, not global as in this paper.
154.2 Monotone comparative statics select stable equilibria
Here I show a converse to the CP: the \right" comparative statics imply stable equilibria. It
seems a strong statement to obtain a stabilityconclusion out of the comparative statics property
of the selection of equilibria alone. This comes at the cost of imposing some more structure on
the problem, basically I require Euclidean spaces, stronger monotonicity assumptions and some
regularity conditions on the equilibria.
The main result here, Theorem 6, is a partial converse to Theorem 4. A xed point e(t) 2
E(t) of the correspondence t is isolated if there is a neighborhood V of e(t)i nX such that
V \E(t)=fe(t)g.
Theorem 6: Let X  Rm and (t;t2 T) be an increasing family of uhc correspondences with
T  Rn convex. 18 Let e : T ! X be a continuous selection from (E(t):t 2 T).I fe is strictly




and e(t) is isolated for some t 2

t;t
o,t h e ne(t) is best case
stable for t.
The second result in the section is a partial converse to Theorem 5. It requires that we rule
out some slightly pathological situations.
Definition 5: Given X  Rn a n daf u n c t i o nf : X ! X, say that a xed point x of f is
regular if there is a neighborhood U of x such that
1. U contains no other xed points of f (i.e. x is locally unique) and
2. the existence of some y 2 U with y f(y) x implies that there is also z 2 U with
x f(z) z.
I call the requirement \regularity" because for a function on R it is the same as asking the
xed point to be regular in the usual sense that its Jacobian has full rank i.e. to cross the
diagonal, not only intersect it. This is illustrated in Figure 3, part b). The rst xed point x1
of f is not regular because there are smaller points y arbitrarily close so that y>f (y) while
18The theorem is true when X is a subset of a Banach lattice whose order cone has a nonempty interior, the













Figure 3: g(x)=x − f(x)
the reverse inequality is not true for points close to x1 that are larger. On the other hand, it
is easy to see that x2 is regular both in the usual sense and in accordance with the denition
above.
The requirement is in general stronger than the usual notion of regularity, though. For
instance, consider Figure 3 a). The map g : x 7! x − f(x)i nR2 is a counterclockwise smooth
rotation of the unit disk that leaves the negative orthant (and 0) xed but condenses the positive
orthant in the (0;−1)(0;1)-cone and stretches the (0;1)(0;−1)-cone into the positive
orthant. I have labeled the intersection of these cones with the disk A;B;C and D so the
picture shows the action of the map. Clearly, this transformation can be made as smooth as
desired and 0 is a 0 of g, i.e. a xed point of f. Then, g is a local dieomorphism of 0 but 0
is not a regular point in the sense used here because while all elements y 2 A satisfy f(y) y,
for all z 2 B, f(z)  z.
Theorem 7: Let X  Rm, T a partially ordered set and (ft;t2 T) be an increasing family
of uhc functions. 19 Fix t;t0 2 T with t  t0,l e te;e 2E (t0), e 2E (t) with e  e e and
E(t0) \ [e;e]=fe;eg.L e tft0 be strictly increasing on [e;e].I fe ft0(e) and e is regular, then
e is strongly stable.
5 The Scope of The Correspondence Principle
Section 4 presents a CP for monotone maps. A question that naturally follows is: does the CP













































Figure 4: An increase in t
one-dimensional problems and no for multidimensional problems. The negative result is known
in the General Equilibrium literature since at least the early 70s (and motivated Arrow and
Hahn (1971) to state that the CP \isn't") and it is indeed related to the ideas in the \anything
goes" results of Sonnenschein, Mantel and Debreu (see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995)
for an exposition).
Proposition 1 considers the one-dimensional case (Milgrom and Roberts (1994) studies
mainly this case). The proposition gives a proof of the simple fact that for a function f :
[0;1] T ! [0;1] that is increasing in t (but not necessarily in x), any decreasing selection of
equilibria must be picking xed points where f crosses the identity \from below". This fact is
easily seen from picture 4 a). When we consider continuous-time dynamics _ xt = f(xt)w i t hf
continuous or discrete time dynamics xk+1 = f(xk)w i t hf dierentiable, crossing from below
is enough for instability.
Proposition 1: Let T  R be convex and f :[ 0 ;1]T ! [0;1] where t 7! f(x;t) is increasing







f(p3;p 2):zi(1;p 2;p 3;t)=0 g
f(p3;p 2):zi(1;p 2;p 3;t 0)=0 g





, then for all t 2

t;t
o, there is an >0 with f(x;t) <xfor x 2
(e(t) − ;e(t)) and f(x;t) >xfor x 2 (e(t);e(t)+).
Proposition 1 is relevant because it covers most of the traditional uses of the CP, partial
equilibrium analysis and general equilibrium with two goods. Other important examples in
the early literature are the macroeconomic IS-LM model and general equilibrium with gross
substitutes, which can be obtained from the results on increasing family of correspondences.
Picture 4 b) demonstrates thatthe converse of Proposition1 (i.e. the analogue of Theorem 6)
is not true in the present context. The unique xed point is not stable (the slope of f is larger
in absolute value than 1) but it is increasing in the parameter. Incidentally, note also that
this picture rules out comparative statics of the Section 3 form since play starting at an old
equilibrium diverges.
Now consider the multidimensional case without the monotonicity that drives the results
in the paper. I will give a graphical example that the CP fails to yield comparative statics
predictions. Suggestively, the example is a three good general equilibrium model. 20 See Arrow
and Hahn (1971, p320 and Ch. 10) for a full discussion.
20Zeroes of an aggregate demand function z are xed points of f(x)=x + z(x), note that simple adaptive
dynamics corresponds to the usual tatonnement adjustment process.
19Consider an economy characterized by the excess demand functions z1;z 2 and z3 where
zi : R3  [0;1] ! R is homogeneous of degree 0, continuous, satises Walras's Law and the
usual boundary conditions (i =1 ;2;3). Say that good 1 is the numeraire. The set of equilibria
can be seen graphically in Figure 5 as the intersections of the (p2;p 3)-loci where z2 and z3 are
zero. Suppose that the map t 7! zi(p;t)o n[ 0 ;1] is increasing for all p and i =2 ;3. Also, let z2
and z3 be increasing in p2 and decreasing in p3. By the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu Theorem,
there is a well behaved pure exchange economy that gives rise to excess demand functions that
coincide with (z1;z 2;z 3) on a set of prices bounded away from zero.
Consider an increase in the parameter t. Then, both loci f(p3;p 2):zi(1;p 2;p 3;t)=0 g must
move \down" because, xing p3, a smaller p2 is needed to get a zero in zi.I t i s e a s y t o s e e
in the picture that the closest new equilibrium is smaller for the smallest of the xed points
and larger for the largest. But here the two extremal equilibria are stable, hence the CP fails
since the requirement of stability and the monotonicity of the excess demand functions in the
parameter is not enough to yield comparative statics results.
6 Applications
6.1 Bertrand Oligopoly
This section shows how the results in the paper are applied to a simple problem: comparative
statics of equilibria in the Bertrand oligopoly game. 21 Assume there is a set N of rms, each
facing a continuous demand function Di(pi;p −i) that depends on its own price pi and the vector
of competitor's prices p−i =( p1;:::p i−1;p i+1;:::p n). Each rm pays a xed marginal cost ct
i
which depends on a parameter t 2 [0;1] and the vector (ct
1;:::c t
n)i si n c r e a s i n gi nt.
Let pi 7! Di(pi;p −i) be monotone decreasing and (pi;p −i) 7! piDi(pi;p −i)h a v ei n c r e a s i n g
dierences. 22 The increasing dierences condition here is a \substitute products" assumption.
In this pricing game, rms simultaneously name prices in an interval [0;p] of the real line and
21This example is also used in Topkis (1979), Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Milgrom and Shannon (1994) and
Topkis (1998).
22That cost be linear is not really needed for this to be a game of strategic complements, see Milgrom and Shan-
non (1994). A sucient condition for increasing dierences to be satised is that Di(pi;p −i) is log-supermodular.
In turn, logit, CES and transcendental logarithmic satisfy log-supermodularity, see MR.
20receive as payostheir prots uit(pi;p −i)=( pi−ct
i)Di(pi;p −i). The interpretationof generalized
adaptive dynamics here is clear: in round k of play each rm can x prices anywhere between
the lowest price that would be optimal if she conjectures that every other rm will pick their
lowest price in the last γ periods and the highest price that would be optimal if she conjectures
that all the other rms will repeat their highest prices in the last γ periods.
It is immediate that uit(pi;p −i) satises the single crossing property in (pi;p −i). Trivially
uit is quasisupermodular in pi since pi 2 [0;p], a chain. Also, since Di(pi;p −i) is decreasing
in pi, uit(pi;p −i) satises the single crossing condition in (pi;t). Then, (Γ(t);t2 [0;1]) with
Γ(t)=( N;f([0;p];u it):i 2 Ng) is an increasing family of games. Hence, all the results in this
paper about the set of Nash equilibrium prices E(t)h o l d .
6.2 Network Externalities
This section presents an application of the results in the paper to a generalization of Farrell
and Saloner's (1985) model of network externalities. Consider a set N of rms that can choose
to adopt a new technology in each of T rounds of play. There are network externalities in
the sense that if a larger number of rms switch to the new standard, then it becomes more
protable for any rm to also change. The model in Farrell and Saloner (1985) has only two
rms and two periods but already in this case it is clear that the Implicit Function Theorem
is not applicable. Indeed, even with one period, since the choice set is discrete, smoothness
and concavity assumptions do not hold. With two stages, the strategy spaces are sets of maps
from the history to the switching choice so the calculus based methods are obviously infeasible.
Here I allow an arbitrary number of rms (it could be a continuum) and any nite number of
periods. 23
Firm i's taste for the technology is private information and it is indexed by i 2 i  R.
Priors on  = i2Ni are given by a Borel probability measure p. Final payos to rm i 2 N
will then be given by a bounded measurable function ui : i f 0;1g
N ! R. Here 1 will
represent the choice to switch and 0 to continue using the old technology. I assume that rms
23This is to simplify, everything can be extended to an innite horizon or to continuous time.
21are not locked in the new technology once they choose 1, this is only to simplify the notation,
it is simple to allow for lock in.
Assume that for ai 2f 0;1g;a −i 2f 0;1g
Nnfig, ui(ai;a −i; i) has increasing dierences in
(ai;a −i)a n di n( ai; i). 24 The former is the assumption of network externalities while the
latter reﬂects Farrell and Saloner's (1985) assumption that larger types are, other things equal,
more likely to switch.
For  =1 ;:::T,l e tH = f0;1g
−1 be the set of possible histories until time  and H =

T
=1H.F i r mi's strategy space Si is the set of measurable maps si : iH!f0;1g
T,d e n o t e
by s
T









Proposition 2: (N;f(Si;U i):i 2 Ng) is a game of strategic complements.
Note that existence of pure strategy equilibria follows by Lemma 1. Typically there will be
equilibria with what Farrelland Saloner call \excess inertia": rms switch to the new technology
only after several rounds in the game. These are just the non-extremal equilibria of this game.
It should also be mentioned that Farrell and Saloner focus on perfect equilibria of this game,
these are a subset of the Nash equilibria so the results in the paper apply.
In the network externalities model, the traditional approach based on the Implicit Function
Theorem cannot be applied. The equilibria we are usually interested in are not the extremal
so the existing results in monotone comparative statics of xed points are not useful.
As an illustration, consider the eect of a reduction in the price of the new technology.
Parameterize payos by t 2 T  R such that for all i 2 N;i 2 i and a−i 2f 0;1g
Nnfig,
ut
i(1;a −i; i) − ut
i(0;a −i; i)i si n c r e a s i n gi nt. The interpretation is that an increase in t makes
switching cheaper. It is easy to see that the model results in an increasing family of games.
Then, reductions in the price of switching sets o learning dynamics that involve sequentially
higher levels of adoption of the new technology. At the same time, the CP implies that stable
selections of equilibria must be monotone increasing. 25
24Order any product of f0;1g by the componentwise order.
25Another example that cannot be obtained by the existing methods is that an increase in the prior distribution
226.3 Are More Players Good or Bad For Coordination Failures?
Consider a team of workers that have to choose the eort they put into a common task. Suppose
there are complementarities in eort (if one works harder, this makes the others more produc-
tive) and positive externalities (if one works harder that makes the others better o). Then
there are typically multiple equilibria with some \hard working equilibria" Pareto dominating
other \low eort equilibria". For examples and applications to Macroeconomics, see Cooper
and John (1988); (other applications include network externalities in Industrial Organization
and tax federalism in Public Finance).
These are usually called games with coordination failures. One natural question is whether
it is more dicult for a large number of people to \coordinate" on harder eort than a small
number.
As shown by Cooper and John, there are two crucial features of coordination failures:
strategic complementarities and positive externalities (which they call spillovers). The rst is
captured by the quasisupermodularity assumption and the second is dened explicitly below.
Cooper and John also make assumptions of smoothness of payos, strict concavity and Inada
conditions to assure that equilibria are interior.
Definition 6: Say that Γ=( N;f(Si;u i):i 2 Ng) is a game of positive externalities if it is a
game of strategic complementarities and if for all i, s−i 7! ui(si;s −i) is nondecreasing for all
si 2 Si.
Given a game of positive externalities Γ = (N;f(Si;u i):i 2 Ng), let T = P(N)t h ep o w e r
set of N and endow T with the inclusion order, where t  t0 if and only if t  t0.A d d
f0i : i 2 Ng dierent elements and for all i 2 N,s e t0 i  inf Si. These will be the \do
nothing" choices. Let f : S ! R be a (strictly) decreasing function with supff(s):s 2 Sg <
p in the monotone likelihood ratio order would lead to larger equilibria (by Athey's (1996) results this implies
single crossing in si and the parameter).
23inf finf fui(s):s 2 Sgi 2 Ng and set 26
Sit =

Si if i 2 t
0i if i= 2 t
uit =

ui if i 2 t
f if i= 2 t:
The result that more players is better follows in Proposition 3. These results are in line
with Camerer and Knez's (1994) experimental ndings for some games of positive externali-
ties. 27
Proposition 3: For any game of positive externalities Γ(t) with a set t  N of players and
equilibrium e 2E(t):
1. If t  t0  N then any convergent general adaptive play starting at e, converges to an
equilibrium e0 2E(t0) with e  e0. Moreover, e0 Pareto dominates e for all players in t0.
2. Let the strategy spaces be convex subsets of Euclidean spaces and si 7! ui(si;s −i) strictly
quasiconcave. If e 2E(t), e0 2E(t0) is the largest equilibrium in E(t0) that is smaller than
e and there are no t0-equilibria larger than e0 that are not also larger than e,t h e ne0 is
unstable.
Note that the Pareto improvement result is driven by the improvement in the new member's
payos. If there are strict externalities then also the old member's payos increase and in
addition we get Pareto domination in part 1 of the Proposition.
7 Concluding Remarks
Comparative statics analysis has two uses. One, in \time series" situations, predicts changes in
a system before and after a parameter has changed. For example, how do price and quantity
in an industry respond after a change in taxes? The second \cross section" use focuses on
26The choice of \non members" payos is just to simplify. If we were to endogenize the option to join this
would not be satisfactory.
27Camerer and Knez (1994) let subjects play a \weakest link" game (which satises the denition of a game of
positive externalities) and add players after some rounds of play. This has the eect of worsening the coordination
problem. The reason is that in their case, an additional player can only make things worse since their \do nothing"
choices are in a sense larger than any strategy of a player in the game. Then, by a simple modication of the
present denition and ordering T = P(N) by set containment, the result follows analogously to Proposition 3
24dierences in two systems that dier in some parameter. For example, if one rm is larger than
another, what can we say about the wages that result in a negotiation with their workers ?
The results in this paper have a natural application to time series. It is a logical requirement
that starting at the old equilibrium, out-of-equilibrium dynamics under the new parameter
values give the new prediction.
For cross section questions, this paper makes no predictions. If players sit down to play
two games that dier in the value of a parameter, then without information about which
equilibria will be selected in general no comparison can be made. One could consider reﬂecting
the ignorance about which equilibrium will be selected by a probability distribution over E(t).
Then, even for monotone problems and using stability as a selection criterion it is easy to
generate examples where the endogenous variables can on average be higher or lower after
an increase in the parameter. This implies that the usual empirical tests that endogenous
and exogenous variables are correlated can be misleading when used on models with multiple
equilibria. The problem of cross section comparative statics seems like an important question
for future research.
8 Proofs
The following Lemma is a version of MR's Theorem 8 for the present context. It is used here
as an auxiliary result in the proof of Theorems 2 and 3. Dene iterations of the lower selections
from  by 0(x)=(x), n(x)=(n−1(x)) for all x and n  1. Dene iterations of the upper
selections 
n(x) similarly.
Lemma 2: Let X be a complete lattice and  : X  X.F i x x 2 X and fxkg2D (x;).I f
x  inf (x) and  is a uhc correspondence that is weakly increasing on [x;M],t h e n ,f o ra l l







Proof: The proof proceeds by induction on n. To get the result for n = 0, do induction
on k using K0 =1 :F i r s t ,n o t et h a tH
γ













. Suppose now that (x)  xl for all 1  l  k − 1, so (x) is a lower bound
25on H
γ
k.T h e n x  inf (x)=(x)  inf H
γ
k.S o , i n f H
γ
k 2 [x;M] and weak monotonicity of
 gives inf (x)  inf (inf H
γ
k). But then inf (inf H
γ
k)  xk.A l s o , M is an upper bound
on H
γ













. This establishes the result for
n =0w i t hK0 =1 .
Now, let Kn−1 work for n−1 in the statement of the Lemma. Set Kn = Kn−1+γ.P i c ka n y
k  Kn. By the inductive hypothesis, for any xl 2 H
γ
k, n−1(x)  xl.T h u sn−1(x)i sal o w e r
bound on H
γ
k so we get n−1(x)  inf H
γ
k. This implies that inf (n−1(x))  inf (inf H
γ
k)
because  is weakly increasing on [x;M]( a n dx  n−1(x)b yx  inf (x)  n−1(x)). Thus,
n(x)  (inf H
γ
k)  xk. Similarly, by the inductive hypothesis, 
n−1
(M) is an upper bound
on H
γ




(M)). This gives xk  
n
(M). 




Proof: Let A be the range of fxkg and x =s u p A =
W
k xk.N o t e t h a t x is also the
supremum of the range of any subsequence of fxkg since by monotonicity the range of any
subsequence has the same set of upper bounds. Let V be any neighborhood of x.T h ec l a i mi s
that eventually xk 2 V for all k.S i n c eV c is closed and the closed order intervals are a sub-basis
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(this is without loss of generality since any ai
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To see this note that if there is a subsequence fxklg with a
j
m  xkl  b
j
m for all l 2 N then
a
j
m  xkl  x and b
j
m is an upper bound on the subsequence so x  b
j




























= V c.S i n c e V was an arbitrary
neighborhood, we conclude xk ! x. 
28The notation
W
k xk refers to the supremum of the range of the sequence fxkg.
26Lemma 4: Let Γ be a game of ordinal strategic complements. Then  is a uhc correspondence
that is nondecreasing in the strong set order.
Proof: By Milgrom and Shannon's (1994) Theorem 4,  is nondecreasing and by their Corol-
lary 2 it is sublattice valued. Upper hemicontinuity and compact valuedness when ui is con-
tinuous in si follows from Berge's maximum theorem (see e.g. Aliprantis and Border's (1994)
Theorem 14.30). For the case where I only require upper semicontinuity, I will use Ausubel
and Deneckere's (1993) version of the Theorem of the Maximum (their Theorem 2). Fix i 2 N
and let  : S−i  R be the projection of the epigraph of x 7! ui(x;)o n t oR.T h a t i s , i n
this case, ()=fy 2 R : y  ui(x;)f o rs o m ex 2 Sig for each  2 S−i. The requirement
in Ausubel and Deneckere's theorem is that  is lower hemicontinuous (lhc). To see that
this is the case, let fg be a net in S−i with  !  (2 S−i). Let x and ^ x be such that
ui(x; )=m a x x02Si ui(x0; ) for all  and ui(^ x;)=m a x x02Si ui(x0;) (possible by compact-
ness of Si and upper semicontinuity of si 7! ui(si;s −i) for all s−i). Then, ()=( −1;u i(^ x;)].




with say xγ ! x 2 Si.E a c h xγ
achieves the maximum, hence ui(xγ; γ)  ui(^ x; γ). By continuity of  7! ui(x;):
liminf
γ ui(xγ; γ)  ui(^ x; ):
Dropping to a further subnet that achieves the liminf (and summarizing indexes by )w e
have f(x; )g converging (componentwise), (x; ) ! (x; )a n dui(x; ) !   ui(^ x; ).
For any y 2 (), let y = ui(x; ) ^ y. Then, y 2 () for all  and y ! y (since
y   so when y =  it is immediate and when y< ,t h e r ei s0 so that 0 <implies
ui(x; ) > ( + y)=2 hence y = y for all 0 < ).
Thus, given that  is a subnet of  we have established that  is l.h.c. This satises the
requirement that  is continuous in the lower Vietoris topology in Ausubel and Deneckere's
(1993) theorem. Then, since Si is a regular topological space and ui is upper semicontinuous,
i is nonempty, compact-valued and upper hemicontinuous.
Hence, each i is upper hemicontinuous and compact valued. Then by Theorem 14.27
in Aliprantis and Border (1994),  is upper hemicontinuous and compact valued. Thus it
27is subcomplete by the Frink-Birkho characterization that subcompleteness is the same as
compactness in the order interval topology (see Birkho's (1967)). 
Proof of Lemma 1 Given t 2 T, s 7! (s;t) is increasing in the strong set order by Lemma
4, hence it is weakly increasing. Given s 2 S, any selection from t 7! (s;t)i si n c r e a s i n gb y
Milgrom and Shannon's (1994) Monotone Selection Theorem, hence it is strongly increasing.
Upper-hemi-continuity and sub complete sublattice valuedness is given by Lemma 4. 
Proof of Theorems 2 and 3 Dene the sequences fxkg, fykg by x0 = y0 = x and xk = k(x)
and yk = 
k
(x)f o rk  1 (all inma and suprema are well dened by the completeness of X).
First I will show by induction that fxkg and fykg are sequences in [x;M]. Since x  inf (x) 
sup(x), x0 = x  x1  y1.I fx  xk−1,t h e nx;xk−1 2 [x;M]. By weak monotonicity of  on
[x;M], then, x  inf (x)  inf (xk−1). This implies that xk 2 [x;M]. The argument for fykg
is identical.
Now,  is weakly increasing on [x;M]a n dx0  x1  y1,s oxk−1  xk and yk−1  yk for
all k.T h u s ,fxkg and fykg are monotone sequences in X. By Lemma 3, xk ! x =
W
k xk and
yk ! y =
W
k yk.
Also,  is sub-complete and sublattice valued on [x;M], so xk 2 (xk−1) for all k  1a n d
thus fxkg2A (x;) D (x;). This implies that x 2 F(x;) and thus F(x;)i sn o n e m p t y .
Now, set zk = xk+1 2 (xk) for all k  1. Since xk ! x and  is upper hemicontinuous on
[x;M] and closed valued, (see Theorem 14.17 in Aliprantisand Border (1994))there is z 2 (x)
and a subsequence fzklg of fzkg such that zkl ! z.B u tfzklg is also a subsequence of fxkg,
and the order interval topology on X is Hausdor because X is a complete lattice, so z = x.
Then x 2 (x)s ox 2E . Clearly, x = x0  x since x =s u pA. The reasoning for fykg is
analogous and gives yk !
W
k yk 2 F(x;) \E.
Let fzkg2D (x;)a n dl e tfxkg and fykg be dened as above. I will show by induction
that fykg is pointwise larger than fzkg.F i r s t , x0  z0  y0 trivially. If xl  zl  yl for all





k  yk−1. By weak monotonicity, then, zk  sup(supH
γ
k)  sup(yk−1)=yk.
Hence, fykg is pointwise larger than fzkg, which implies that the set of upper bounds of
28the range of fykg is contained in the set of upper bounds of fzkg.B u t yk ! y =
W
k yk
so limsupk zk  y. By Lemma 2, for all n, xn = n(x)  liminf zk. Thus liminf zk is
an upper bound on the range of fxng.B u t xn !
W
n xn = x,s ow eg e tx  liminfzk.
Hence, x  liminf zk  limsupzk  y. In particular, if fzkg2D (x;)i sc o n v e r g e n tt h e
corresponding limit will also be in [x;y ]. Thus, x and y are, respectively, lower and upper
bounds on F(x;) and since x;y  2 F(x;) this implies x =i n fF(x;)a n dy =s u pF(x;).
Hence F(x;) is nonempty and has a smallest element, inf F(x;) 2E, and a largest element,
supF(x;) 2E, proving item 1 in Theorem 3 and the rst half of Theorem 2.
To nish the proof of Theorem 2, rst note that inf F(x;) 2Eand thatx  inf F(x;)s in c e
inf F(x;)=
W
k xk, hence fz 2E: x  zg6 = ;.L e te 2f z 2E: x  zg. By induction I show
that e is an upper bound on the range of fxkg. First note that x0 = x  e implies x0;e2 [x;M].
Then, xk−1  e and weak monotonicity of  on [x;M]i m p l yt h a txk =i n f(xk−1)  inf (e)
and xk 2 [x;M]. But e 2 (e)s oi n f(e)  e.T h u s , xk  e for all k. Since inf F(x;)=
W
k xk this implies that inf F(x;) is a lower bound on fz 2E: x  zg. But we proved that
inf F(x;) 2f z 2E: x  zg, thus proving Theorem 2.
Finally, assume that  is strongly increasing over [x;M]. Let fzkg2A (x;). By the
argument above, fzkg is a sequence in [x;M]a n dz0 = x  z1.S i n c e is strongly increasing,
zk−2  zk−1, zk−1 2 (zk−2)a n dzk 2 (zk−1), we conclude that zk−1  zk. Inductively, then,
fzkg is monotone. By repeating the argument made above for the inmum selection fxkg we
obtain that limk zk exists and limk zk 2E .S i n c efzkg2A (x;) D (x;), limk zk 2 F(x;).
This proves item 2 in Theorem 3. 
Proof of Corollary 2 Let fzkg2D (x;). Dene the sequences fxkg and fykg like in
the proof of Theorems 2 and 3. We already know that yk !
W
k yk = y and that zk 
yk  y for all k. Let the sequence fOng be given by On =[ xn;y ]
c,w h i c hi saB o r e ls e t
for the interval topology for each n.G i v e n n 2 N,t a k eKn from Lemma 2. For any k 




1Ondk = limk!1 k(On)=0 . B u txn !
W
n xn =i n f F(x;)a n d
y =s u p F(x;), so it immediately follows that [inf F(x;);supF(x;)] = \n [xn;y ]. By
29the De Morgan laws, [inf F(x;);supF(x;)]
c = [n [xn;y ]
c. Then by \left continuity" of ,
([inf F(x;);supF(x;)]
c)=([nOn)=0 . 
Proof of Theorem 5 Let fxkg be the only element of A(e;ft0)( ft0 is a function so A(e;ft0)
is a singleton). By Theorem 3, since ft0 is strongly increasing and continuous, limk xk =
inf fz 2E(t0):e  zg.T h e ne 2f z 2E(t0):e  zg and there exist no z 2E(t0)w i t he  z  e
because E(t0) \ [e;e]=fe;eg. Hence e =i n ffz 2E(t0):e  zg and limxk = e.
Let P = fx 2 Rm :0 xg be the positive cone in Rm.N o w ,e − e 2 Po so there exists a
neighborhood W of e with e  z for all z 2 W.L e tz 2 W\[e;e]a n dl e tfzkg2A (z;f(:;t0)). By
induction I show that xk  zk  e for all k.F i r s t ,x0 = e  z0  e. Second, if xk−1  zk−1  e
then monotonicity of ft0 implies that ft0(xk−1)  ft0(zk−1)  ft0(e)=e. Hence, xk  zk  e for
all k. But limk xk = e so e  liminfzk  limsupzk  e, which then implies that zk ! e.
By Dancer and Hess's (1991) Proposition 1, either there exist z in [e;e] arbitrarily close
to e such that ft0(z)  z or there exist z in [e;e] arbitrarily close to e such that z  ft0(z).
The rst possibility is ruled out by the preceding paragraph because for any z in that situation
fzkg2A (z;ft0) would be a monotone decreasing sequence that does not converge to e.
Hence, for every neighborhood N of e there is z 2 N \ [e;e]w i t he  z  ft0(z). Let
fzkg2D (z;ft0)a n df^ zkg2A (z;ft0). Using the fact that z  ^ z0 and z  ^ zk−1, we conclude
that z  ft0(^ z)  ft0(^ zk−1)=^ zk. Therefore, inductively, z is a lower bound on the range of f^ zkg.
Hence, e  z  liminfk ^ zk. Here, f^ zkg coincides with the inmum and supremum selection in
Theorem 3. Therefore, e  z  liminfk ^ zk  liminfk zk so and zk 9 e (in fact using Theorem 3
it is easy to see that zk ! e). Since N was arbitrary, e i sn o tb e s tc a s es t a b l e .
Proof of Theorem 6 Let t 2

t;t
o be such that e(t)i si s o l a t e d .L e tN be a neighborhood
of e(t)w i t hN \E(t)=fe(t)g and let P = fx 2 Rm :0 xg be the positive cone in Rm.L e t
Br and B2r be open balls contained in N with center e(t) and radii r and 2r, respectively. Take
t1;t 2 2 e−1(Br) \

t;t
o with t1 t t2. Note then that [e(t0);e(t1)]  B2r. To see this, set
e(t) = 0 without loss of generality. If x 2 [e(t0);e(t1)] then x_0  e(t1)a n d( −x)^0 − e(t0).
Then
jxj = x _ 0+( −x) ^ 0  e(t1) − e(t0)=0_ (e(t1)+e(t0)) − 0 ^ (e(t1)+e(t0)) = je(t0)+e(t1)j
30so since k:k isa latticenorm, kxkk e(t0)+e(t1)k.B u te(t0);e(t1) 2 Br so kxk2maxfke(t0)k;ke(t1)kg 
2r. Hence x 2 B2r.
Now, e(t0) e(t) e(t1), i.e. e(t) 2 e(t0)+Po and e(t) 2 e(t1) − Po.L e t V =( e(t0)+
Po) \(e(t1)−Po) \X,aX-relatively open neighborhood of e(t). The claim is that V satises
the denition of worst case stability.
Let the sequences fyng and fzng be such that y0 = e(t0), z0 = e(t1)a n dyn =i n ft(yn−1),
zn =s u pt(zn−1) for all n  1. Then fyng and fzng are simple adaptive play from t and, by
Theorem 3, yn ! e0 and zn ! e00 with e0;e 00 2E (t). Now, for any x 2 V ,l e tfxkg be some
arbitrary generalized adaptive play from t starting at x0 = x. By Lemma 2, applied twice
(once dually on X to get the second inequality), yn  liminfk xk  limsupk xk  zn for all n.
This implies that e0  liminfk xk  limsupk xk  e00.T h e ne0;e 00 2 [e(t0);e(t1)]  B  N and
therefore e0 = e00 = e(t) by local isolation. Then, e(t)  liminfk xk  limsupk xk  e(t), so that
xk ! e(t). Thus V satises the denition of worst case stability. 
Proof of Theorem 7 Let ffxkgg = A(e;ft0). It is easy to see by induction that fxkg
is a strictly increasing sequence since ft0 is strictly increasing on [e;e]a n de ft0(e)F i r s t ,
x0 = e ft0(e)=x1. Second, if xk−2 xk−1 then xk−1 xk.N o w ,l e tU be the neighborhood
of e in the denition of regularity, since xk ! e (see the proof of Theorem 5), there is K 2 N
such that k  K implies xk 2 U.
Since xK xK+1 = ft0(xK) e,a n de is regular there is y 2 U with e ft0(y) y.S o ,
xK e y and therefore there are open sets O1 and O2 with y − e 2 O1  Po and e − xK 2
O2  Po.L e tO =( y − O1) \ (xK + O2), clearly O is an open neighborhood of e.L e tz 2 O,
then y−z 2 Po and z−xK 2 Po so that xK z y.L e tfzkg2D (z;ft0)a n dfykg2A (z;ft0),
note that fxkg and fykg coincide with the inmum and supremum selections because f is
single valued. Inductively, then, xK+k  zk  yk for all k 2 N because xK  z0  y and if










This establishes that e is worst case stable. 
31Proof of Proposition 1 Let t 2

t;t
o.N o t e t h a t e(

t;t
o) \f 0;1g = ; or e would not
be strictly decreasing. Pick >0 such that (e(t) − ;e(t)+)  e(

t;t
o) (possible since e is
decreasing and continuous). If x 2 (e(t) − ;e(t)) then there is t0 2

t;t
o such that x = e(t0).
Now, t0  t implies that x = e(t0)  e(t)s ow em u s th a v et0 >t .S i n c ef is increasing in t we
have x = f(x;t0) >f(x;t). The proof that x<f(x;t)f o rx 2 (e(t);e(t)+) is analogous. 
Proof of Proposition 2 Clearly Si is a lattice in the componentwise order, by Tychono's
Theorem it is compact. It is immediate that Ui is continuous since a convergent net in S =
i2NSi converges in its T-th component, which by Lebesgue's DominatedConvergence Theorem
implies that the integral in the denition of Ui converges. To see that si 7! U(si;s −i)i s
quasisupermodular note that for any si;s 0
















But this expression is the same as U(si _ s0
i;s −i) − U(s0
i;s −i). Finally, Ui satises the single
crossing property in (si;s −i) because ui has increasing dierences. 
Proof of Proposition 3 The claim is that the family of games Γ(t)=( N;f(Sit;u it):i 2 Ng)
is an increasing family of games. Clearly for any t,Γ ( t) is a game of strategic complementarities
and Sit is increasing in t. The strict single crossing condition in (s;t) is satised vacuously
for ui;t when i= 2 t because f is monotone decreasing. For i 2 t, strict single crossing in
(s;t) follows by strict single crossing in (si;s −i). This proofs the proposition except for the
statement about Pareto domination. For any i 2 t0nt, uit(e)=f(e) <u it0(e0)a n df o ra n yi 2 t,
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